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For the Corridor,the problem is not frequency. Yeah it could always use more, but the real challenge is the time it takes to get to the destination. Due to these shorter distances, the competition is not with the car, but with air travel. It stands to reason that the easy sell is higher speeds/lower travel times. ALTO is one of those "if you build it, they will come" things. The biggest challenge is getting it built as soon as possible 15years is too long for the general public to wait. Babies born today will be getting ready to go for their drivers license when it is projected to open. My hope is that the Carney government can see this as a critical infrastructure project and throw the money and resources at it to build it quicker
 
I don't think that perceived perception of what people would think would have had any role in the decision. It would come down to the economic modelling, where the results of the transport modelling would show not enough modal shift from car and air to create the travel demand that would work without excessive subsidies.
With VIA already recovering some 120-130% of its direct operating costs on the Corridor, the question is not one of subsidies to cover any deficits of the operating costs, but of the capital costs. And this is where HSR will require significantly more governmental capital funding than the entire capital costs of HFR. If you believe that HFR was fiscally unviable, then HSR is even more dead…
 
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With VIA already recovering some 120-130% of its direct operating costs on the Corridor, the question is not one of subsidies to cover any deficits of the operating costs, but of the capital costs. And this is where HSR will require significantly more governmental capital funding than the entire capital costs of HFR. If you believe that HFR was fiscally unviable, then HSR is even more dead…
Capital costs are easier to run a defict on. As unlike operating costs, you have an asset. With the relatively small improvement in travel times with HFR, there wouldn't be much ridership growth, so no additional revenue to cover capital. With a significant increase in ridership with high-speed service, operations could actually run at a profit.
 
Capital costs are easier to run a defict on. As unlike operating costs, you have an asset. With the relatively small improvement in travel times with HFR, there wouldn't be much ridership growth, so no additional revenue to cover capital. With a significant increase in ridership with high-speed service, operations could actually run at a profit.
Especially true if there's integration between flights and alto and/or an elimination of domestic flights to induce demand for alto.


Only way you could ever consider the above is if alto is actually fast enough to be considered a true replacement of flights between these cities that we assume it could be.

Air Canada being part of the consortium might point to this future
 
Today's Globe puts an expanded (to Windsor) Alto on the list of projects that Prime Minister Carney is said to be tabling with provincial Premiers this week.

It does seem that the new government may be leaning towards the high end of this project. I wonder however whether other things will crowd this one out when the government finally has a firm fiscal reckoning....there won't be a federal budget until the fall.

The Globe also says that Ontario's premier has a list of projects to table, including GO expansion.

I do wonder where the legacy routes and services stand in all of this. $5B spent immediately on regional and local transport might have far more immediate and direct impact than $50B spent 10 years in the future when Alto is shovel ready. Of course, this might force government to confront the reluctance of freight railways to share their row's.

Ford also wants his beloved tunnel - I hope this at least is shot down. But it will be interesting to see whether there is balance between interest in Alto and interest in more conventional rail investment. Personally, I figure that my grandkids can wait a few more years to ride Alto....what we need today is the investment in the legacy system, which does not require the same lead time for consultation and design..

- Paul
 
With VIA already recovering some 120-130% of its direct operating costs on the Corridor, the question is not one of subsidies to cover any deficits of the operating costs, but of the capital costs. And this is where HSR will require significantly more governmental capital funding than the entire capital costs of HFR. If you believe that HFR was fiscally unviable, then HSR is even more dead…
Were talking about 2 different things here. Fiscal viability and passenger viability.

Fiscally HSR is expensive, we publicly know its 60-90 billion, but its something we need. and it will get funding.

HFR as noted by VIA themselves and by alto, showed that it wouldnt have enough passengers riding it to create enough modal shift making it fiscally unviable.
 
Capital costs are easier to run a defict on. As unlike operating costs, you have an asset.
You are right that once you have an asset, it's use is only dependent on your ability to cover the operating costs. The tiny problem you are missing is that your ability to build an asset is only dependent on your ability to cover the capital costs and this is what decides whether HSR gets build in 10 or 100 years...
With the relatively small improvement in travel times with HFR, there wouldn't be much ridership growth, so no additional revenue to cover capital. With a significant increase in ridership with high-speed service, operations could actually run at a profit.
VIA's existing Corridor operations already recover more than their marginal costs (on a per-train-km basis). This is why the operational deficit (i.e., including its fully-allocated overheads) of VIA's overall revenues grew 3 times faster than its costs between 2014 and 2019, when its train-mileage grew by 12.5% (an increase which was driven almost entirely on the Corridor, where train mileage grew by 16.5% in that period):
1748699205938.png


Had this trend been sustained, VIA's Corridor services would have fully absorbed its fully-allocated costs by 2032:
1748698922125.png

Compiled and extrapolated from: VIA Rail Annual Reports 2014 and 2019

It is important to note that this growth was mostly driven by an increase in frequency (16.5% in train mileage on the Corridor, as previously mentioned) and not a decrease in travel time (quite on the contrary: the fastest scheduled travel time between Montreal and Toronto increased by 19 minutes (or 7%) from 4:30 in January 2014 to 4:49 in June 2019.

As some people have tried to explain to you, the majority of passenger benefits would come from a decrease in perceived travel time, not: actual travel time. I unfortunately can't share the entire Passenger Demand Forecasting Handbook here, but Table B4.10 of the PDFH6 December 2017 Edition provides the following "Service Interval Penalties" for "Full fare & Season passengers": 15, 26, 39, 51, 63 and 87 for headways of 15, 30, 60, 90, 120 and 180 minutes, respectively. This means that increasing the frequency from currently 6 trains per day (18 operating hours divided by 6 departures equals an average headway of 3 hours) to hourly service would have the same effect on demand as cutting the travel time by 48 minutes (i.e., 87-39) when all things remain equal. Add to that the average delay currently suffered and you have already unlocked the travel time savings of an entire hour without having cut a single minute from the actual travel time.

***

Were talking about 2 different things here. Fiscal viability and passenger viability.

Fiscally HSR is expensive, we publicly know its 60-90 billion, but its something we need. and it will get funding.

HFR as noted by VIA themselves and by alto, showed that it wouldnt have enough passengers riding it to create enough modal shift making it fiscally unviable.
Economic viability refers to the capacity and willingness of investors to a) build and b) operate an asset at their own economic risk (i.e., after any government subsidies and guarantees received).
Fiscal viability refers to the capacity and willingness of the government to provide enough subsidies for an investor (public, private or a mix of both) to a) build and b) operate an asset.
Commercial viability refers to the ability of an operator to set fares which generate enough revenues to cover the operating costs he faces (i.e., this excludes any operating subsidies he might receive, but includes any financing costs he has to pay off the construction costs).

Given that we can all agree that the project can't be funded without any form of governmental subsidies or guarantees for its construction, Commercial viability cannot be seen in isolation of fiscal and economic viability...
 
I feel it would be beneficial to compare ALTO with HS2 to gain some perspective:
ALTOHS2
HSR CorridorTRTO-OTTW-MTRL-QBECLondon-Birmingham (with trains continuing to cities far beyond)
HSR Corridor Length850 km180 km (own estimate, EUS-to-BHM is 182 km)
Assumed train frequency per hour2 (1 Express, 1 Local)8 (assuming existing frequencies: 2 to BHM, 3 to MAN, 1 to LIV, 1 to GLA and 1 to EDI)
National GDP (nominal, 2023)C$2.94 trillion
(US$2.142 trillion)
C$4.65 trillion
US$3.381 trillion
Construction cost estimateC$90 billionC$137 billion (74 billion GBP [2024])
- in % of GDP3.1%16.4% 2.9% (no idea what I initially calculated here!)
- per kmC$105 millionC$760 million
- per hourly departureC$45 billionC$17.1 billion

Sure, we can reassure ourselves that HS2 is 7 times as expensive as ALTO on a per-km basis. However, relative to national GDP, ALTO is just as ambitious as Europe’s most ambitious HSR.

Even worse, when when taking that investment in relation to the number of trains which would serve that line (and in the case of HS2 serve an area much, much beyond HS2), we are suddenly almost three times as ambitious as HS2. And given how controversial HS2 is even in a country where passenger rail is the backbone of intercity travel and not just a niche mode like here in Canada, this should deeply worry us - especially now that Southwestern Ontario is apparently getting scope-creeped into this already unrestrained project...

Edit: I changed the service frequency for the ALTO scenario from 3 (in the original version quoted below) to 2 tph, as both, the small number of local stations and their relatively modest ridership potential gives me a hard time believing in the commercial viability of a third hourly frequency…

Edit 2: I fixed the HS2-as-%-of-UK-GDP figure, which was almost five times too high.
 
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I feel it would be beneficial to compare ALTO with HS2 to gain some perspective:
ALTOHS2
HSR CorridorTRTO-OTTW-MTRL-QBECLondon-Birmingham (and beyond)
HSR Corridor Length850 km180 km (own estimate, EUS-to-BHM is 182 km)
Assumed train frequency per hour3 (2 Express, 1 Local)8 (assuming existing frequencies: 2 to BHM, 3 to MAN, 1 to LIV, 1 to GLA and 1 to EDI)
National GDP (nominal, 2023)C$2.94 trillion
(US$2.142 trillion)
C$4.65 trillion
US$3.381 trillion
Construction cost estimateC$90 billionC$137 billion (74 billion GBP [2024])
- in % of GDP3.1%16.4%
- per kmC$105 millionC$760 million
- per hourly departureC$30 billionC$17.1 billion

Sure, we can reassure ourselves that relative to their Economy's size or on a per-km basis, HS2 is 5 and 7 times as ambitious as ALTO. However, when taking that investment in relation to the number of trains which would serve that line (and in the case of HS2 serve an area much, much beyond HS2), we are suddenly almost twice as ambitious as HS2. And given how controversial HS2 is in a country where passenger rail is the backbone of intercity travel and not just a niche mode like here in Canada, this should deeply worry us - especially now that Southwestern Ontario is apparently getting scope-creeped into this ever-expanding project...
Toronto - Windsor should have been part of this in the first place. We built an entire transcontinental railway as one project, why should we not build the entire Corridor HSR as one project, when it is something that will be transformative to the area and solve some key transportation issues. Until the construction plan comes out,we do not know whether the scope creep has happened. However, if that entire section can be done by ~2040 then let it creep.
 
I feel it would be beneficial to compare ALTO with HS2 to gain some perspective:
ALTOHS2
HSR CorridorTRTO-OTTW-MTRL-QBECLondon-Birmingham (with trains continuing to cities far beyond)
HSR Corridor Length850 km180 km (own estimate, EUS-to-BHM is 182 km)
Assumed train frequency per hour3 (2 Express, 1 Local)8 (assuming existing frequencies: 2 to BHM, 3 to MAN, 1 to LIV, 1 to GLA and 1 to EDI)
National GDP (nominal, 2023)C$2.94 trillion
(US$2.142 trillion)
C$4.65 trillion
US$3.381 trillion
Construction cost estimateC$90 billionC$137 billion (74 billion GBP [2024])
- in % of GDP3.1%16.4%
- per kmC$105 millionC$760 million
- per hourly departureC$30 billionC$17.1 billion

Sure, we can reassure ourselves that relative to their Economy's size or on a per-km basis, HS2 is 5 and 7 times as ambitious as ALTO. However, when taking that investment in relation to the number of trains which would serve that line (and in the case of HS2 serve an area much, much beyond HS2), we are suddenly almost twice as ambitious as HS2. And given how controversial HS2 is in a country where passenger rail is the backbone of intercity travel and not just a niche mode like here in Canada, this should deeply worry us - especially now that Southwestern Ontario is apparently getting scope-creeped into this ever-expanding project...
I dont understand why we are measuring in terms of "hourly departures". Not to mention youre counting branch frequencies from HS2? Id argue it shouldnt be 8, it should be the 3 to Manchester.
 
I dont understand why we are measuring in terms of "hourly departures". Not to mention youre counting branch frequencies from HS2? Id argue it shouldnt be 8, it should be the 3 to Manchester.
I‘m using train frequencies in order to measure a proxy for the ridership benefits HS2 will provide. Given that existing Express trains to Birmingham, Wolverhampton, Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow and Edinburgh will all use HS2, all of these trains need to be counted. And mind you that I‘m only looking at the existing non-peak frequencies for the HS2 scenario, so before considering any service increases in response to the lower travel time and higher train capacity south of Birmingham. An apples-to-apples comparison of the Status Quo would place ALTO at a single train per hour (one train every 3 hours to Toronto and 2 trains within that same time period to Ottawa)…
 
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I‘m using train frequencies in order to measure a proxy for the ridership benefits HS2 will provide. Given that existing Express trains to Birmingham, Wolverhampton, Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow and Edinburgh will all use HS2, all of these trains need to be counted. And mind you that I‘m only looking at the existing non-peak frequencies for the HS2 scenario, so before considering any service increases in response to the lower travel time and higher capacity south of Birmingham. An apples-to-apples comparison of the Status Quo would place ALTO at a single train per hour (one train every 3 hours to Toronto and 2 trains within that same time period to Ottawa)…
HSR is not always HFR. The good thing is, with a dedicated line, more trains can be added to match the need. Lets assume on opening day they are 1 train an hour. Once it is shown to be fast and on time, I would not be surprised it more frequency is added throughout the day where the demand is highest. That is what is needed even today, but is not possible due to track usage.
 
Speeding up impact/environmental assessments for Alto will save time and money. This might've been one of the limitations for the 5 year development phase. And more funding for land acquisition could help speed things up.
 
Speeding up impact/environmental assessments for Alto will save time and money. This might've been one of the limitations for the 5 year development phase. And more funding for land acquisition could help speed things up.
All of that is great, but fails to acknowledge the elephant in the room, which is who will cough up the $90+ billion necessary to make ALTO become reality…
 

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