afransen
Senior Member
They should use the money planned to be spent on the loop to relocate and expand CCTT to Hurontario (either at Rathburn or Burnhamthorpe), and use buses to service the loop with queue jump lanes, etc.
T3G
Senior Member
You can't change the design (nor should anyone want to), but if, as the ML apologists on here were trying to convince us a few years ago, they genuinely have learned their lessons, they can employ more competent project managers and contractors, now that Finch and Eglinton have been wrapped up, and Hurontario is not even halfway done. Laying a surface rail line should not take anywhere near this length of time. But it's Metrolinx we're dealing with here, there was never any danger of them learning anything and those who claimed otherwise were merely selling us snake oil.
Bojaxs
Senior Member
I'm more concerned about the contractor that was hired to construct this line (Mobilinx). If it's true that they're financial underwater, and their credit rating is near "junk" level, then I'm worried the finished product will be of very low quality.
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denfromoakvillemilton
Senior Member
Tell them to shift focus to the Kitchener and Milton lines, use the money for all-day service to Mississauga and Brampton. Extend the subway from Kipling to Square One. Done.
Amare
Senior Member
The thing is, neither Metrolinx nor the Provincial government has learned anything from the failures of Eglinton and Finch West because if they did they would've been rectifying the mess that is Hurontario. But every time we hear news about Hurontario, it just keeps spiralling and gets even worse.
Then we have a clown of a premier who comes out and says that "he loves our public service", but essentially comes out and doubles down that the private sector is doing a much better job at transit construction than the public service could ever do, and he has no intention on scrapping the P3 model.
So let's just sit here and wait for Mobilinx so gradually self-destruct and leave Metrolinx to handle the exploded rubble afterwards. The alarm bells are ringing, but nobody at the province or Metrolinx wants to listen because they are incompetent.
Bojaxs
Senior Member
Why do some Mississauga city councilors seem so interested with getting construction started on the downtown loop when the original line appears to be in complete disarray?
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afransen
Senior Member
If planned completion is now 2028 and Mobilinx is bankrupt, probably more like 2030.
drum118
Superstar
People have thought I was out to lunch on timeframe here, elsewhere including city staff over the years, but I rely on my background experience in construction for that timeframe with some out of my scoop background knowledge. I have been wrong on various dates as I am not at Mobilinx meets nor have seen any detail drawings to get a better handle on timeframe.
My timeframe for opening of the line has been a moving target the last few years based on what I am seeing firsthand as well word on the street and other sources.
I am saying the timeframe today is based on several unknowns starting with the loop, how much trackwork must be rebuilt alone with unknown intersection.
All intersections north of the 401 that have been rebuilt were fully rebuilt that took a month each other than Topflight. So far Trader intersection south of the 401 has only seen a small section done and a guessing game for Matheson at this time. Work is only taking place for the northbound track. I heard in 2025 that Eglinton intersection is to be torn up and have wait to see if it happens as well what other intersection that may see rebuilt. Both Matheson and Eglinton will be a tow phase project taking 8 weeks.
When will Burnhamthorpe intersection get torn up to put the wye in is an unknown as if it will be done this year or in 2027 to get the mainline into service or will be done when there is an contractor doing the loop with an opening date end of 2027 or 2028 for the mainline or wait until 2029-30 for the loop is ready for service,
The loop has a big effect on service from having service in two phases. Phase 1 would be as plan since 2019 as a mainline with no transfers that will require less LRV's online or do you do it as a phase two with splinting the line and forcing riders to transfer at Square One Station with more LRV's on the line after the loop is built and ready for service. You are talking about 1-3 years between the phases depending on when the contract is awarded.
At this time, I forgot to mention in my last update that the OS poles are now down to south of Eglinton with a number missing along with brackets and tension equipment on them. Also, duct work is in place for Mineola Station.
By the end of the summer, all the guideway work could be completed for the whole corridor but not sure if all the trackwork will be in place. The overhead system is unknown how much of it will be strung and in operation by the end of the year, but north of Eglinton will be operation up to Topflight with testing taking place by summer assuming all out standing trackwork that is not in place is ready for it as well the rebuilt sections.
Depending on how much work is fully completed as well as much testing is taking place south of Eglinton by year end, you may have a possible opening date in Dec 2027 but more like sometime in 2028 for the mainline only. With the loop in play now and if done in phases, you are looking at 2029-30.
According to my photos, work stated in April 2020 with OMSF as well some corridor work in December 2020. Real work on the corridor got underway in May 2021 with work starting on the Mary Fix Creek and the Port Credit station with other work in other place for the remaining of the year. This corridor started after Finch.
ML has not be forth coming on issues and timeline and will continue to do so until near the opening date that is about 3-5 years down the road.
BOT Construction who has a 5% stake in the contract was doing most of the work until the fall of 2024 when removed from the corridor work. AMICO who has a 15% stake in the corridor contract was playing a small until 2024 and now the main contractor for the project since the fall of 2024. From my observation for BOT construction from day one to 2024, they lack manpower for their work and some of its was substandard with some of that being rebuilt again.
I have no access to the credit rating of Mobilinx and have no idea what their credit rating is other that mention in the papers, but the word on the streets is saying its very poor. Without funds on hand, for sub-subcontractors, suppliers who are not getting pay on time from the normal 30-60 days less the 10% hold back which is industries standard to 120+days that various sub-subcontractors stop doing work or pullout doing work. We are not talking small amounts. Some were owe $50,00-$500,000 from the word on the street to non return of rental equipment.
End of the day, I will say there is only 35% of rail lay and in place 100%. Work has been delay for years caused by the telecom companies and hydro not removing the poles south of the QEW as well completion hydro poles and wiring north of the QEW in the same timeframe. More poles on the westside south of the QEW have been removed since my last posting as well all the hydro poles north of the North Service Rd to Bronte College with hydro string wires and other work going north as far as King St this week which was the hydro plan for this year as noted in 2025.
With problems with Mobilinx, ML has taken a more on hand approach to get things back on track. It’s not that easy to remove Mobilinx from the corridor as there are many fingers from it that are part of the project and would mean replacing the whole team. This would require ML issuing contracts to all involved doing the work without shutting down the project from 1-3 years to get someone to take over Mobilinx contract and the 30 years for it once completion is done for it at a higher price. It has happened many times in the past where contractors and trades have been removed from projects over various reasons that has caused some delay with the owner paying the bills of trades to keep the project going while they hire someone on short notice and a cost to replace the contractor. Contractors do the same thing for trades.
One of the biggest issues for rework and delays has been caused by IBI Group now part of Arcadis with work being design and detail in London UK that are arriving 85% completed still today with some major rework when the 100% drawing show up. I started off in the design and detailing area before moving on and up with nothing left our office for work in the shop or field unless it was 100% done and sign off by the project engineers, Architects and contractor/developer/owner,
Since there are very few major projects going on this year as well late 2025, AMICO has a large pool of trade people to go after to help speed up the work on the line as well subtrades. Even the able to hire a few more subtrades well help the corridor. The corridor is busy south of the QEW and up north of the 401 now. If the weather remains a lot warmer that January and get better in the coming months, it will be a busy corridor this year seeing work done and completed. Time is money and longer it takes, more it will cost.
As to why various councillors’ want the loop and pushing it is the fact that they don’t understand transit and thing Mississauga revolves around the centre core.
Where CCTT is and will be move to is a continue issue since OMERS wants it close to the mall and offering a cheaper price for the land
My timeframe for opening of the line has been a moving target the last few years based on what I am seeing firsthand as well word on the street and other sources.
I am saying the timeframe today is based on several unknowns starting with the loop, how much trackwork must be rebuilt alone with unknown intersection.
All intersections north of the 401 that have been rebuilt were fully rebuilt that took a month each other than Topflight. So far Trader intersection south of the 401 has only seen a small section done and a guessing game for Matheson at this time. Work is only taking place for the northbound track. I heard in 2025 that Eglinton intersection is to be torn up and have wait to see if it happens as well what other intersection that may see rebuilt. Both Matheson and Eglinton will be a tow phase project taking 8 weeks.
When will Burnhamthorpe intersection get torn up to put the wye in is an unknown as if it will be done this year or in 2027 to get the mainline into service or will be done when there is an contractor doing the loop with an opening date end of 2027 or 2028 for the mainline or wait until 2029-30 for the loop is ready for service,
The loop has a big effect on service from having service in two phases. Phase 1 would be as plan since 2019 as a mainline with no transfers that will require less LRV's online or do you do it as a phase two with splinting the line and forcing riders to transfer at Square One Station with more LRV's on the line after the loop is built and ready for service. You are talking about 1-3 years between the phases depending on when the contract is awarded.
At this time, I forgot to mention in my last update that the OS poles are now down to south of Eglinton with a number missing along with brackets and tension equipment on them. Also, duct work is in place for Mineola Station.
By the end of the summer, all the guideway work could be completed for the whole corridor but not sure if all the trackwork will be in place. The overhead system is unknown how much of it will be strung and in operation by the end of the year, but north of Eglinton will be operation up to Topflight with testing taking place by summer assuming all out standing trackwork that is not in place is ready for it as well the rebuilt sections.
Depending on how much work is fully completed as well as much testing is taking place south of Eglinton by year end, you may have a possible opening date in Dec 2027 but more like sometime in 2028 for the mainline only. With the loop in play now and if done in phases, you are looking at 2029-30.
According to my photos, work stated in April 2020 with OMSF as well some corridor work in December 2020. Real work on the corridor got underway in May 2021 with work starting on the Mary Fix Creek and the Port Credit station with other work in other place for the remaining of the year. This corridor started after Finch.
ML has not be forth coming on issues and timeline and will continue to do so until near the opening date that is about 3-5 years down the road.
BOT Construction who has a 5% stake in the contract was doing most of the work until the fall of 2024 when removed from the corridor work. AMICO who has a 15% stake in the corridor contract was playing a small until 2024 and now the main contractor for the project since the fall of 2024. From my observation for BOT construction from day one to 2024, they lack manpower for their work and some of its was substandard with some of that being rebuilt again.
I have no access to the credit rating of Mobilinx and have no idea what their credit rating is other that mention in the papers, but the word on the streets is saying its very poor. Without funds on hand, for sub-subcontractors, suppliers who are not getting pay on time from the normal 30-60 days less the 10% hold back which is industries standard to 120+days that various sub-subcontractors stop doing work or pullout doing work. We are not talking small amounts. Some were owe $50,00-$500,000 from the word on the street to non return of rental equipment.
End of the day, I will say there is only 35% of rail lay and in place 100%. Work has been delay for years caused by the telecom companies and hydro not removing the poles south of the QEW as well completion hydro poles and wiring north of the QEW in the same timeframe. More poles on the westside south of the QEW have been removed since my last posting as well all the hydro poles north of the North Service Rd to Bronte College with hydro string wires and other work going north as far as King St this week which was the hydro plan for this year as noted in 2025.
With problems with Mobilinx, ML has taken a more on hand approach to get things back on track. It’s not that easy to remove Mobilinx from the corridor as there are many fingers from it that are part of the project and would mean replacing the whole team. This would require ML issuing contracts to all involved doing the work without shutting down the project from 1-3 years to get someone to take over Mobilinx contract and the 30 years for it once completion is done for it at a higher price. It has happened many times in the past where contractors and trades have been removed from projects over various reasons that has caused some delay with the owner paying the bills of trades to keep the project going while they hire someone on short notice and a cost to replace the contractor. Contractors do the same thing for trades.
One of the biggest issues for rework and delays has been caused by IBI Group now part of Arcadis with work being design and detail in London UK that are arriving 85% completed still today with some major rework when the 100% drawing show up. I started off in the design and detailing area before moving on and up with nothing left our office for work in the shop or field unless it was 100% done and sign off by the project engineers, Architects and contractor/developer/owner,
Since there are very few major projects going on this year as well late 2025, AMICO has a large pool of trade people to go after to help speed up the work on the line as well subtrades. Even the able to hire a few more subtrades well help the corridor. The corridor is busy south of the QEW and up north of the 401 now. If the weather remains a lot warmer that January and get better in the coming months, it will be a busy corridor this year seeing work done and completed. Time is money and longer it takes, more it will cost.
As to why various councillors’ want the loop and pushing it is the fact that they don’t understand transit and thing Mississauga revolves around the centre core.
Where CCTT is and will be move to is a continue issue since OMERS wants it close to the mall and offering a cheaper price for the land
ARG1
Senior Member
There is something I want clarified, does the loss in credit rating directly apply to the consortium members, or is it just the consortium itself that gets hit with it?Mobilinx has completed only 45% of the track work so far. That part was supposed to be finished by fall 2024. Last year, the P3 consortium’s credit rating was downgraded (again) to BBB-, the lowest rating before it’s considered junk.
The more this project fails, the less bitter I am about the name Doug Ford christened it.
Large portions of Hurontario LRT track still not laid, intersections unfinished | Globalnews.ca
Construction on the 18-kilometre, 19-stop light rail route between Port Credit and Steeles Avenue began in 2020 and was originally scheduled to be completed in 2024.globalnews.ca
drum118
Superstar
The main players in the consortium are effected as AMICO, BOT and a few others are paid by them and have their risk financially in place.
Look at Mobilinx Website as who is part of the consortium and just notice that PCL is now a delivery partner, No idea for what as I have yet seen any sign of them so far.
HuroHuro
New Member
Hello everyone. First of all, I want to thank you all for your contributions and discussion throughout the years of this project. Having followed this thread for a long time and recently moved on from the project, I’m finally in a position to share some context. I am a former member of Mobilinx; I’m keeping my specific position private, but I spent enough time on the project to provide some first-hand facts for the group.
Who is Who
The consortium/JV was initially led by Astaldi and Hitachi. Astaldi was responsible for civil and trackworks (via a sub-consortium with Bot and Amico), while Hitachi handled systems and vehicles (supplied by Alstom). PCL was hired for the OMSF building, with IBI Group (now Arcadis) on civil design. Notably, Astaldi was bought out/rescued by Salini Impregilo (forming Webuild) after the contract was awarded, which created significant internal turbulence.
The Bid
During the tender process, only two proposals submitted a price. Other consortia pulled the plug right before submission due to the inherent risks of the project delivery method, the client (Metrolinx), and lessons learned from other projects that were already struggling at the time (e.g., Crosslinx). Even after previous governments trimmed the scope and budget, the price submitted was insufficient. Many items weren't priced to Canadian standards, indirect costs were missed, and the small contingency evaporated quickly.
The Design & Reworks
When COVID hit, designers went home—literally. This added massive hurdles to evolving the design into something constructible. At the OMSF, the traction power substations (TPSS), and the guideway median, the civil work requirements are directly determined by the systems team (Hitachi), who faced their own delivery delays. This forced civil works to proceed at risk, leading to inevitable reworks.
Mistakes in trackwork design at intersections have resulted in the concrete busters you see on-site now. Between design errors and poor supervision, contractors were fired and several people were invited to quit.
The Utility Delay Reality
Standard phasing assumes utility relocation and road widening are finished before the median work starts. This requires coordination with Metrolinx, the Cities of Mississauga and Brampton (both of which are inexperienced with infrastructure mega-projects not managed directly by them), the MTO, and utility providers.
In this case, it failed everywhere. Utilities never moved at the pace they were supposed to due to a lack of commitment and extreme difficulty securing permits from the Cities and MTO—requirements that were unknown during the tender. To keep from stalling, we performed road widening before utilities moved. That’s why you see poles surrounded by asphalt today; it was a desperate mitigation strategy to allow our own utility work (storm, sanitary, watermain) to continue while third parties lagged.
Management & Self-Inflicted Wounds
While "delays by others" are real, we had plenty of self-inflicted wounds. Turnover has been incredibly high, from admin staff up to the Project Director and CEO. In a niche, competitive market, people are constantly being headhunted by mega-projects like the Ontario Line. Bringing in managers with zero Canadian experience sunk the project deeper. Furthermore, internal processes (or the lack thereof) and T&M contracts with partners meant there was often no real incentive for production.
Metrolinx & Accountability
For a long time, dealing with Metrolinx was like talking to a wall. Every call for help regarding permit hurdles or financial stress seemed to fall on deaf ears. However, as of late, there have been key changes in their top management. Since the previous CEO resigned and new leadership took over, the dynamic has shifted. While things seem to be improving, it will take time before these changes have a tangible impact on contractor performance and the final schedule.
As for the possibility of firing Mobilinx, it’s complicated—Webuild is already part of another consortium for the Ontario Line. It’s hard to imagine how Metrolinx could defend that from a PR perspective, not to mention the massive claims and lawsuits that would inevitably follow.
The Schedule
The latest recovery schedule targets a late 2028 completion. Based on the progress I see here and discussions with former colleagues, I don’t believe that is realistic. Between COVID, material shortages, labor strikes, and the factors described above, the timeline is under immense pressure.
I'll keep an eye on the thread and jump in if I can add any helpful context to the ongoing discussion.
Who is Who
The consortium/JV was initially led by Astaldi and Hitachi. Astaldi was responsible for civil and trackworks (via a sub-consortium with Bot and Amico), while Hitachi handled systems and vehicles (supplied by Alstom). PCL was hired for the OMSF building, with IBI Group (now Arcadis) on civil design. Notably, Astaldi was bought out/rescued by Salini Impregilo (forming Webuild) after the contract was awarded, which created significant internal turbulence.
The Bid
During the tender process, only two proposals submitted a price. Other consortia pulled the plug right before submission due to the inherent risks of the project delivery method, the client (Metrolinx), and lessons learned from other projects that were already struggling at the time (e.g., Crosslinx). Even after previous governments trimmed the scope and budget, the price submitted was insufficient. Many items weren't priced to Canadian standards, indirect costs were missed, and the small contingency evaporated quickly.
The Design & Reworks
When COVID hit, designers went home—literally. This added massive hurdles to evolving the design into something constructible. At the OMSF, the traction power substations (TPSS), and the guideway median, the civil work requirements are directly determined by the systems team (Hitachi), who faced their own delivery delays. This forced civil works to proceed at risk, leading to inevitable reworks.
Mistakes in trackwork design at intersections have resulted in the concrete busters you see on-site now. Between design errors and poor supervision, contractors were fired and several people were invited to quit.
The Utility Delay Reality
Standard phasing assumes utility relocation and road widening are finished before the median work starts. This requires coordination with Metrolinx, the Cities of Mississauga and Brampton (both of which are inexperienced with infrastructure mega-projects not managed directly by them), the MTO, and utility providers.
In this case, it failed everywhere. Utilities never moved at the pace they were supposed to due to a lack of commitment and extreme difficulty securing permits from the Cities and MTO—requirements that were unknown during the tender. To keep from stalling, we performed road widening before utilities moved. That’s why you see poles surrounded by asphalt today; it was a desperate mitigation strategy to allow our own utility work (storm, sanitary, watermain) to continue while third parties lagged.
Management & Self-Inflicted Wounds
While "delays by others" are real, we had plenty of self-inflicted wounds. Turnover has been incredibly high, from admin staff up to the Project Director and CEO. In a niche, competitive market, people are constantly being headhunted by mega-projects like the Ontario Line. Bringing in managers with zero Canadian experience sunk the project deeper. Furthermore, internal processes (or the lack thereof) and T&M contracts with partners meant there was often no real incentive for production.
Metrolinx & Accountability
For a long time, dealing with Metrolinx was like talking to a wall. Every call for help regarding permit hurdles or financial stress seemed to fall on deaf ears. However, as of late, there have been key changes in their top management. Since the previous CEO resigned and new leadership took over, the dynamic has shifted. While things seem to be improving, it will take time before these changes have a tangible impact on contractor performance and the final schedule.
As for the possibility of firing Mobilinx, it’s complicated—Webuild is already part of another consortium for the Ontario Line. It’s hard to imagine how Metrolinx could defend that from a PR perspective, not to mention the massive claims and lawsuits that would inevitably follow.
The Schedule
The latest recovery schedule targets a late 2028 completion. Based on the progress I see here and discussions with former colleagues, I don’t believe that is realistic. Between COVID, material shortages, labor strikes, and the factors described above, the timeline is under immense pressure.
I'll keep an eye on the thread and jump in if I can add any helpful context to the ongoing discussion.
smallspy
Senior Member
First off, welcome to the forum.
A lot of consortia purposely undervalue their bid in an attempt to make up the difference with change orders and chargebacks and other sundry fees. I can't feel sorry for you if you try it and fail.
Dan
In fairness, this was on you guys. Crosslinx had the same problem - their competing bidder estimated at the time that they were on the hook to lose a billion dollars - and as it turns out, it looks like they were right.
A lot of consortia purposely undervalue their bid in an attempt to make up the difference with change orders and chargebacks and other sundry fees. I can't feel sorry for you if you try it and fail.
Dan
Northern Light
Superstar
@HuroHuro
Let me join Smallspy in welcoming you to the forum.
Its always good to add someone with insights on projects we're discussing to the mix!
This is one of my knocks on P3s. I have many. But what you describe above is not uncommon on project bids in Ontario.
From a hospital in Niagara where we ended up with only 1 bidder, to the messes in Ottawa and on Finch among others, with teams that lacked sufficiently experienced personnel and who often didn't work together, or with government particularly well. Some of that falls on others, but much is self inflicted or foreseeable.
In general, this should result in people's professional credentials being revoked. That a newbie, fresh out of school might muff something is not unexpected but that's why projects are to supposed to have experienced, highly qualified managers/supervisors who should catch those mistakes before they are built!
* here I will divulge some inside info from one party to this project on a staff change for just such a reason.
I certainly don't think people should escalate every mistake or frustration to maximum bridge burning right out of the gate. But this is the sort of thing that either needs to be publicly spoken about or leaked to the media the moment one realizes that satisfactory resolution will not be forthcoming.
Presuming one has hired well, contracts should lock people down for the duration of a project. I don't understand leaving that open ended.
Phil Verster was a jerk. I said that early on in his tenure. How he got hired remains a mystery to me. His past at Scottish Rail was not something to recommend him.
I dont' doubt you, but I will add, I think its possible to do better, just not likely. I think this is the sort of thing that needs to be discussed in the open. Certainly from my sources, the outstanding work is not complicated, just time consuming because of the way in which it is scheduled and staffed.
Please do.
Let me join Smallspy in welcoming you to the forum.
Its always good to add someone with insights on projects we're discussing to the mix!
This is one of my knocks on P3s. I have many. But what you describe above is not uncommon on project bids in Ontario.
From a hospital in Niagara where we ended up with only 1 bidder, to the messes in Ottawa and on Finch among others, with teams that lacked sufficiently experienced personnel and who often didn't work together, or with government particularly well. Some of that falls on others, but much is self inflicted or foreseeable.
In general, this should result in people's professional credentials being revoked. That a newbie, fresh out of school might muff something is not unexpected but that's why projects are to supposed to have experienced, highly qualified managers/supervisors who should catch those mistakes before they are built!
* here I will divulge some inside info from one party to this project on a staff change for just such a reason.
I certainly don't think people should escalate every mistake or frustration to maximum bridge burning right out of the gate. But this is the sort of thing that either needs to be publicly spoken about or leaked to the media the moment one realizes that satisfactory resolution will not be forthcoming.
Presuming one has hired well, contracts should lock people down for the duration of a project. I don't understand leaving that open ended.
Phil Verster was a jerk. I said that early on in his tenure. How he got hired remains a mystery to me. His past at Scottish Rail was not something to recommend him.
I dont' doubt you, but I will add, I think its possible to do better, just not likely. I think this is the sort of thing that needs to be discussed in the open. Certainly from my sources, the outstanding work is not complicated, just time consuming because of the way in which it is scheduled and staffed.
Please do.
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crs1026
Superstar
Thank you for this. Very helpful detail.
Perhaps the only way projects of this size have a hope of succeeding is if there is some third party oversight with sufficient arms length from either the project or the government to audit and report publicly on issues. With perhaps the same mandate as one sees in some organizations who offer anonymous, 1-800 style reporting for safety issues
I can understand why individuals do not whistle-blow, but one does wonder how to bring issues to light when the project structure works against that to such a degree.
- Paul