No, but the same level of PPP/Metrolinx incompetence can only hinder. Which is why I added 20+ for MX. For sure, we *could* do it faster, but the same people claiming the upper governments would pay for it are the same people who forget that they do things poorly.
If we want subways built quickly, it would mean the feds and the province would have to fork over money with little input and keep at arms length. And with so many photo ops and campaign stump points, that’s not going to happen in our lifetimes.
The ongoing conjecture that P3s and 'Metrolinx incompetence' are the source of
every issue, large or small, on these projects is growing tiresome. It's an easy answer but an implausible one, and belies a lack of understanding, or lack of interest in understanding, the root cause.
Yes, both the P3 model and Metrolinx incompetence have had impacts on this project. But, if Metrolinx incompetence is a primary driver of delays and overruns, we would have to believe that it consistently outsmarted the judgment of thousands of people across multiple organizations and disciplines, not just once, but repeatedly. For 15 years. Camman.
The larger issue sits above any single agency or project. Government contracts now account for a majority (approximately 80%) of the large civil infrastructure market in Canada. This has substantially reshaped industry behaviour. The limited number of capable firms have organized themselves around winning and administering public contracts because that is where the most money is. In a more functional market, those firms would compete on delivery speed, build quality, and productivity. Here, profit comes from winning the work and then protecting the margins as defined at contact award. The result is a deeply unproductive industry.
And, it goes without saying, this environment is a poor fit for AFP. AFP relies on competitive pressure and genuine risk exposure to drive efficiency and innovation. In a market dominated by a single buyer, that discipline weakens. What passes for innovation tends to be for the purposes of value engineering and margin protection, not better outcomes for the public. That is not inherently a flaw with P3s, but on the LRT projects this disconnect between delivery model and contract I don't think was adequately recognized.