[T3G]

I thought only the last few of the old-style cab cars had the better crash resistance - and not the early ones? I guess they are making some structural changes as well to the 200-214 cars?

Only cab cars no. 300+ were built with the new CEM technology. These were delivered from 2016 onwards.

Cars 200-257 were all built to the same general design, the only change I know of is that the later cars which were built by Bombardier (242+) came with two windows on the front instead of 1, which the ogre-eyed Hawker-Siddeley/Can-Car Rail cars were later upgraded to match.

All of the above photos are mine.

I do not see any appreciable structural changes in the photos of the refurbished cab cars. I think their look would have to change significantly if they were to incorporate the CEM technology. I'm not sure who's photo this is, but if the owner is here and wishes for me to credit them or take the photo down than please do not hesitate to reach out.

 

[nfitz]

If they don't have the same structural protection, isn't Metrolinx opening itself for a big lawsuit if an operator gets killed in a collision, using the old cabs?

Though we all know that safety is not a priority for the decision makers, now matter how much they make their minions tweet about it.

 

[reaperexpress]

I thought only the last few of the old-style cab cars had the better crash resistance - and not the early ones? I guess they are making some structural changes as well to the 200-214 cars?

Maybe they have in mind to run the old cab cars on services which are mostly grade separated so the chance of a collision with a truck is minimal.

Here's a map of level crossings
Green = Grade Separation
Orange = Level crossing (typical)
Red = Level crossing (particularly awkward)

Lakeshore West (east of Hamilton), Kitchener (east of Mount Pleasant), Stouffville (south of Unionville) and Lakeshore East all have high levels of grade separation. There are currently a group of level crossings on the Stouffville line south of Unionville, but these are planned to be eliminated, including the awkward crossing at Danforth Rd.

 

[RU479]

Maybe they have in mind to run the old cab cars on services which are mostly grade separated so the chance of a collision with a truck is minimal.

But even then, wouldn’t they still be extremely vulnerable if god forbid they collide with another train?

The Chatsworth Train collision in 2008 highlighted the vulnerability of the older BiLevels, so there is still that risk.

 

[RU479]

You know, from what I’ve heard, only the very last batch of old cab car, being 255-257, actually have these improved safety features. 200-254 do not.

 

[gotransitboyhere]

Any more pics of the refurbished cabs

 

[reaperexpress]

But even then, wouldn’t they still be extremely vulnerable if god forbid they collide with another train?

The Chatsworth Train collision in 2008 highlighted the vulnerability of the older BiLevels, so there is still that risk.

All trains are vulnerable if they collide with another train. If you want to prevent injuries and fatalities from train-to-train collisions, you need to prevent collisions from happening in the first place, which is totally doable with modern signalling systems. The Chatsworth collision would have been prevented if there had been some form of Automatic Train Protection present, such as the PTC system which has since been installed on Metrolink and all other US passenger railways. ATP also would have prevented the vast majority of US train crashes which have occured over the past decade.

The GO network does not have any ATP, but GO has so far managed to keep a clean record. However, the 2012 Burlington VIA derailment was on trackage which has since been purchased by GO, and I think the same type of signalling system is in place (though they made some site-specific improvements to signal placement). That derailment was caused by significantly exceeding a switch's turnout speed, which would have been prevented by an ATP system.

ONexpress is planning to install ETCS signaling on the GO network, which includes ATP functions. That is where a real improvement of safety will occur. At this point the main obstacle is to get ETCS approved by Transport Canada, since it is based on EU regulations, not Canadian ones.

 

[gotransitboyhere]

Any pics of 212?

 

[RU479]

Any pics of 212?

Can you please stop asking for pictures of the refurbished cab cars all the time? They will be posted when people take them.

 

[RU479]

But as for the 200-214, I heard they may get some structural changes done on the inside to atleast give them some level of protection in the event of an accident.

 

[Bordercollie]

But as for the 200-214, I heard they may get some structural changes done on the inside to atleast give them some level of protection in the event of an accident.

I would think that it's not as simple as reinforcing the plow, which was the case with the Hyundai cars. The concern is likely less with head on train collisions but more so with vehicles at level crossings. This is why in California they stopped using them as lead cars.

If they found a way to reinforce the front structure of the cab without changing the design too much that would be good to protect the operator.

 

[gotransitboyhere]

I was always wondering why metrolink stopped using those cab cars.

 

[smallspy]

All trains are vulnerable if they collide with another train. If you want to prevent injuries and fatalities from train-to-train collisions, you need to prevent collisions from happening in the first place, which is totally doable with modern signalling systems. The Chatsworth collision would have been prevented if there had been some form of Automatic Train Protection present, such as the PTC system which has since been installed on Metrolink and all other US passenger railways. ATP also would have prevented the vast majority of US train crashes which have occured over the past decade.

It could be argued that simply following the existing rules would also lead to a reduction of accidents.

The GO network does not have any ATP, but GO has so far managed to keep a clean record. However, the 2012 Burlington VIA derailment was on trackage which has since been purchased by GO, and I think the same type of signalling system is in place (though they made some site-specific improvements to signal placement). That derailment was caused by significantly exceeding a switch's turnout speed, which would have been prevented by an ATP system.

Uhhh, 1997 would like a word with you. https://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/1997/r97t0299/r97t0299.html

The biggest reason why Burlington happened was the lack of a sterile cab. I get that coworkers want to be buddy-buddy, but at the same time in a safety-conscious position like theirs distractions - such as the conversation that they were having with the third man in the cab - have been shown time and time again to be problematic and worse. There is a reason why outside electronic devices are banned in the operating cabs of all railway equipment in Canada.

Also, a nitpick: the trackage that the Burlington derailment/accident occurred on has never been owned by GO, and isn't likely to ever be owned by GO.

ONexpress is planning to install ETCS signaling on the GO network, which includes ATP functions. That is where a real improvement of safety will occur. At this point the main obstacle is to get ETCS approved by Transport Canada, since it is based on EU regulations, not Canadian ones.

I'm very curious to see what happens with this plan, and if they have a fall-back (or fall-backs) in case their primary plans get shot down. The existing signal system, if installed correctly, is extrememly robust and capable of running very tight headways. Of course, the one thing it lacks is any sort of oversight or protection of signal indications, but that isn't insurmountable in the North American sphere of operations.

Dan

 

[reaperexpress]

It could be argued that simply following the existing rules would also lead to a reduction of accidents.

Yes, of course. But in general you won't get down to nearly-zero until you can override human error.

Uhhh, 1997 would like a word with you. https://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/1997/r97t0299/r97t0299.html

Still 0 fatalities and 0 serious injuries, but indeed not a clean record.

The biggest reason why Burlington happened was the lack of a sterile cab. I get that coworkers want to be buddy-buddy, but at the same time in a safety-conscious position like theirs distractions - such as the conversation that they were having with the third man in the cab - have been shown time and time again to be problematic and worse. There is a reason why outside electronic devices are banned in the operating cabs of all railway equipment in Canada.

The main reason given for the Burlington derailment was that signal was placed prior to the station, without a repeater at the platform. The crew was fully aware that they would be diverging, however they had misremembered the specific type of diverging indication.

Ideally operators would be 100% concentrated all the time, but that is something that is physically impossible for humans to consistently do for tasks with such a low level of mental engagement.

Also, a nitpick: the trackage that the Burlington derailment/accident occurred on has never been owned by GO, and isn't likely to ever be owned by GO.

Right... I had in my head that it was just east of Burlington station (now GO territory), but in fact it was just east of Aldershot which is indeed very much CN territory.

I'm very curious to see what happens with this plan, and if they have a fall-back (or fall-backs) in case their primary plans get shot down. The existing signal system, if installed correctly, is extrememly robust and capable of running very tight headways. Of course, the one thing it lacks is any sort of oversight or protection of signal indications, but that isn't insurmountable in the North American sphere of operations.

No indeed the current system could be upgraded with PTC or a PTC-like add-on. I suspect that they may prefer ETCS on a familiarity/interoperability basis (countless suppliers for components). If they're interested in the higher levels of ETCS, then they could use virtual blocks and the cost for a short-block system would much less than a legacy system such as GO's, since you don't need physical equipment for every block.

 

[crs1026]

It could be argued that simply following the existing rules would also lead to a reduction of accidents.

You sound like a railway executive ;-)

A core principle of safety system design - whether nuclear reactor, airplane, railway or otherwise - is defense in depth - multiple redundant standalone systems.

I would argue that the railway rules are more like a set of dominoes. Not only is there often no redundancy, one failure can trigger further failures. Too much reliance on human performance where oversight or backstopping by automated technology ought to be in place. It comes down to money not spent.

The biggest reason why Burlington happened was the lack of a sterile cab. I get that coworkers want to be buddy-buddy, but at the same time in a safety-conscious position like theirs distractions - such as the conversation that they were having with the third man in the cab - have been shown time and time again to be problematic and worse. There is a reason why outside electronic devices are banned in the operating cabs of all railway equipment in Canada.

No one should assume that those three were discussing the Blue Jays. There are other incidents documented where a 2-person crew (without visitors present) committed errors simply because they got engrossed in a discussion of what they were doing, and lost situational awareness.

The risk of too many people is complacency - one person figuring the others are still watching what's happening. But whenever the work is split across even two people, the risk is that no one person can handle all the inputs. Which is different than one person performing the work and the other overseeing as a second line of defense.

In short, whatever PTC or equivalent is installed on GO and VIA, it can't come too soon.

- Paul