^To get a little closer to the original point, things that would make me more confident that the project is viable would be
- evidence that route planning is not unduly influenced by politics
- evidence that consultation is scaled appropriately and not used to gain leverage or blend in unrelated agendas
- evidence that special interest groups are not impeding that process (or creating delay eg by forcing negotiation through nuisance litigation)
- evidence of a proper design with appropriate detail in advance of costing and commercial negotiation
- transparency with respect to accountability and standards for contracted parties, with oversight of same within the public line of sight
- rigourous scope control
- transparent project reporting and monitoring
- a clear and definitive service plan and standards both for Alto and for legacy services (which the government has claimed are to be retained after Alto goes into operation)
As it stands, in the absence of much of the above, I happen to agree that the Alto procurement is likely already off the rails and deserving of redirection or ultimate cancellation - an outcome that none of us wants, but may be the only wise decision a new government can make.
Lastly, the most important decision for a new government is not whether to invest in Alto, it's how to equalise and manage the relationship between all tenant passenger operators and the host railways. That policy change does not require a multi year co-development activity - it's a simple legislative change which could be tabled as soon as the new Minister is sworn in. If anyone had the resolve to do so.
- Paul
Was recently watching a live stream with Reece Transit on YouTube, and he also talked about the HSR project with the same concerns:
- scope creep
- lack of focus on the core purpose of a transportation project like HSR = getting a large volume of people from A to B at high speed efficiently while keep capital and operating costs to the minimum. Every other goal should be secondary.
- turning transportation and transit projects into a “catch all” magic solution for all of Canada’s economic and social problems (e.g. housing crisis, affordability issues, unemployment issues, social equity, inclusion and diversity issues, indigenous reconciliation issues, the list goes on and on…). Classic example of this is DC’s streetcar line that served 99 economic and political purposes (housing redevelopment, revitalization of neighborhoods, etc.) except forgetting its one and only core purpose of being a fast and convenient mode of transportation that serve its local residents.…
Reece also noted that the above pattern is not just unique to Canadian transit projects but a lot of Anglo-sphere countries like US, UK, Australia, who are all struggling with skyrocketing transit project costs and timelines.
Literally these are some of the most wealthy countries in the world seemingly unable to deliver and build 21st century light and heavy rail projects for our citizens, it’s just mind boggling. While developing countries with much less financial resources are able to get HSR and heavy rail transit projects up and running at a faster pace and a fraction of the cost of what is being quoted in Canada, UK, Australia, and the United States. This is just wild.